The use of "no evidence" statements in public health by Cummings, L
 
© Louise Cummings. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2015), pp. 32-64. 
	  
The Use of “No Evidence” Statements 
 in Public Health 
 
LOUISE CUMMINGS 
 
School of Arts and Humanities 
Nottingham Trent University  
Clifton Campus 
Clifton Lane, Nottingham, 
NG11 8NS, England 
louise.cummings@ntu.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract: Public health communica-
tion makes extensive use of a lin-
guistic formulation that will be 
called the “no evidence” statement. 
This is a written or spoken statement 
of the form “There is no evidence 
that P” where P stands for a proposi-
tion that typically describes a human 
health risk. Danger lurks in these 
expressions for the hearer or reader 
who is not logically perspicacious, 
as arguments that use them are only 
warranted under certain conditions. 
The extent to which members of the 
public are able to determine what 
those conditions are will be consid-
ered by examining data obtained 
from 879 subjects. The role of “no 
evidence” statements as cognitive 
heuristics in public health reasoning 
is considered. 
Résumé: La communication sur la 
santé publique emploie souvent une 
expression linguistique qu’on nom-
mera «énoncé d’absence de preuve». 
C’est un énoncé écrit ou oral dont la 
forme est «Il n’existe aucune preuve 
que P » où P signifie une proposi-
tion qui décrit généralement un 
risque pour la santé humaine. Les 
arguments qui utilisent ces énoncés 
ne sont probants que dans certaines 
conditions. On examinera des don-
nées obtenues de 879 sujets pour 
déterminer la mesure dans laquelle 
les membres du public peuvent iden-
tifier ces conditions. On étudiera le 
rôle des énoncés d’absence de 
preuve  comme heuristique em-
ployée dans les raisonnements sur la 
santé publique.  
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formal fallacy; logic; public health; reasoning; risk assessment; uncertainty 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
One consequence of the rapid expansion of media reporting in 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries is that it can seem that we 
live in an age of constant health scares and other public health 
crises. On a daily basis we are confronted with stories about the 
safety of food, the risks associated with prescribed medications 
and immunizations, and potential harms associated with expo-
sure to environmental toxins and to outbreaks of infectious dis-
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ease. Some of the most noteworthy of these episodes in recent 
years have involved the safety of beef for human consumption 
following the emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) in cattle, the risk of thrombosis associated with the oral 
contraceptive pill and the role of measles, mumps and rubella 
(MMR) immunization in the development of autism in children, 
and outbreaks of SARS and avian and swine influenzas which 
have the potential to traverse the globe within hours of their first 
detection. Public reactions to these events have ranged from in-
difference to hysteria. Between these extremes in response lie 
the large majority of citizens who wish to receive rational, evi-
dence-based advice from public health officials and political 
leaders. While this is an entirely reasonable expectation on the 
part of the public, it is also an expectation that is not readily sat-
isfied in most of the public health crises that have emerged in 
recent years. This is because so many of these crises have in-
volved pathogens (e.g., BSE, SARS), modes of transmission 
(e.g., international air travel) and diseases or disorders (e.g., au-
tism) that are either novel or are still not well understood. Pre-
dictions about the risks of these events to human health are thus 
riven with uncertainty. Certainly, they are not the type of cer-
tain, infallible advice that the public expects to receive from its 
public health leaders.  
Against this backdrop of inflated expectation, the public 
health professional must embark on a process of health commu-
nication with members of the public. The aims of this communi-
cation are many, and include the need to provide accurate in-
formation to people, to achieve the compliance of the public 
with important health measures, and to allay public anxiety and 
avert widespread and disabling panic. An important question for 
public health workers is clearly one of how this can best be 
achieved. It is argued in this paper that in recent years, public 
health officials have increasingly employed a particular logico-
linguistic strategy in their health communications with the pub-
lic. This strategy involves the use of “no evidence” statements, 
often with a frequency and consistency that can appear over-
whelming, at least to certain observers. These statements have 
logical and linguistic properties that warrant examination on 
their own terms. But additionally, “no evidence” statements 
have become an important part of the communication toolkit of 
public health officials and workers in their engagement with the 
public. This paper examines both aspects of these commonly 
used, but somewhat neglected, statements.  
The discussion begins with an examination of different 
forms of these statements in spoken and written public health 
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communications that have occurred in the last 20 to 30 years. 
These communications span a range of public health problems 
including the BSE epidemic in the UK, concerns about the hu-
man health risks of new technologies such as the genetic modi-
fication of food, and possible cancer risks associated with pros-
thetic breast implants. The paper will then consider the functions 
of “no evidence” statements in public health contexts. These 
functions are intimately connected with the logical attributes of 
these statements, and specifically their role as premises in argu-
ments from ignorance. Finally, to the extent that these state-
ments are generally employed with the aim of discounting cer-
tain risks to human health, and thus allaying public anxiety, the 
discussion considers if members of the public are adept at as-
sessing the logical conditions under which this is a reasonable 
use of these statements. To address this issue, this part of the 
discussion will draw on data from 879 subjects who participated 
in a study of public health reasoning. 
 
 
2.  “No evidence” statements in public health 
 
Even a cursory examination of some of the communications is-
sued by national and international health agencies reveals the 
widespread use of “no evidence” statements by public health 
officials. These communications originate in different geograph-
ical regions, concern a wide range of public health issues and 
relay health advice to the public through broadcast and print 
media. In illustration of these statements, several examples will 
be considered in this section in preparation for discussion of the 
main linguistic and logical features of these statements in the 
next section. The emergence of BSE in British cattle in Novem-
ber 1986 marked the beginning of a particularly protracted and 
difficult period in the public health of the UK (Cummings 
2010a). Such extensive use was made of “no evidence” state-
ments by health officials during the ensuing epidemic  that they 
became the mantra of the BSE affair.1 Responding to media 
coverage of a suspected case of BSE transmission to a 15-year-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   In the 16-volume report published following the public inquiry into BSE, 
Lord Phillips (chairman) and his team remarked: “On each occasion that pub-
lic concerns were raised about BSE, they were met with the same refrains— 
‘There is no evidence that BSE is transmissible to humans’; ‘It is safe to eat 
beef’” (BSE Inquiry 2000: 133). The report added, “risk communication in 
relation to BSE was flawed” (133). 
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old girl, the Chief Medical Officer, Dr Kenneth Calman, re-
leased a statement on 26 January 1994 in which he remarked: 
 
 (1) On the basis of the work done so far, there is no evi-
dence whatever that BSE causes Creutzfeldt-Jakob dis-
ease (CJD) and, similarly, not the slightest evidence that 
eating beef or hamburgers causes CJD. (BSE Inquiry 
2000: 143) 
 
Two variants of the “no evidence” statement, involving claims 
of “no reason” and “no scientific justification”, also repeatedly 
appeared in public health advice about BSE. For example, fol-
lowing the announcement to British Parliament in March 1996 
that BSE had transmitted to humans, the Spongiform Encepha-
lopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) advised Mr Stephen 
Dorrell, Secretary of State for Health, that: 
 
(2) There is no reason to believe that children are particu-
larly susceptible to BSE. (BSE Inquiry 2000: 164)  
 
On 17 May 1990, at the request of the Chief Medical Officer, 
Sir Donald Acheson, SEAC held an emergency meeting to con-
sider the implications of the discovery of a spongiform encepha-
lopathy in a domestic cat. Following the meeting, SEAC sent a 
letter to the Chief Medical Officer in which it was stated: 
 
(3) In our [SEAC’s] judgement any risk as a result of eat-
ing beef or beef products is minute. Thus we believe that 
there is no scientific justification for not eating British 
beef and that it can be eaten by everyone. (BSE Inquiry 
2000: 131) 
  
A more recent health problem, which has caused particular con-
cern for women, is the safety of poly implant prostheses (PIP) 
breast implants. In January 2012, Sir Bruce Keogh, the Medical 
Director of the National Health Service in the UK, presented an 
interim report of an expert group that had been convened to con-
sider the safety of PIP implants. The report stated: 
 
(4) The expert group consider that, on the available data, 
there is no evidence that PIP implants are associated with 
a higher risk of breast cancer than other silicone gel im-
plants. (6) 
  
Shortly afterwards in May 2012, a fact sheet on silicone gel 
filled breast implants was issued by the Chief Medical Officer of 
the Australian Department of Health and Ageing. It stated: 
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 (5) There is no evidence of increased risk of breast can-
cer or connective tissue disorders. (1) 
There is no evidence that the risk of anaplastic large cell 
lymphoma in the breast for PIP breast implants is greater 
than for all silicone gel filled breast implants. (1) 
 
In the same month, a statement from Ireland’s Chief Medical 
Officer was released. It contained advice from the Department 
of Health and the Irish Medicines Board on PIP breast implants. 
It read as follows: 
 
 (6) There is no evidence of increased risk of cancer for 
women with this implant. 
 
New technologies continue to raise public health concerns. A 
number of national and international health agencies have at-
tempted to address these concerns. In May 2010, a report on the 
potential health impact of wind turbines by the Chief Medical 
Officer of Health of Ontario, Canada stated that: 
 
(7) Concerns have been raised about human exposure to 
“low frequency sound” and “infrasound” from wind tur-
bines. There is no scientific evidence, however, to indi-
cate that low frequency sound generated from wind tur-
bines causes adverse health effects. (6)  
 
In May 1999, the UK’s Chief Medical Officer, Professor Liam 
Donaldson, co-authored a report with Sir Robert May on the 
health implications of genetically modified (GM) foods. The 
report concluded: 
 
(8) We have considered the processes used in genetic 
modification in relation to events occurring in nature and 
in conventional plant breeding and we conclude that there 
is no current evidence to suggest that the process of ge-
netic modification is inherently harmful. (23) 
 
In May 2006, the World Health Organization (WHO) published 
a fact sheet on electromagnetic fields and public health. Based 
on a review of scientific research in the area, WHO arrived at 
the following conclusion: 
 
 (9) Considering the very low exposure levels and re-
search results collected to date, there is no convincing 
scientific evidence that the weak radiofrequency signals 
from base stations and wireless networks cause adverse 
health effects. 
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This list could be extended to include “no evidence” statements 
from a range of other public health contexts. But little would be 
achieved by enumerating further examples. Our primary data is 
certainly sufficient at this point to permit an examination of the 
logical and linguistic features of these statements. It is to this 
examination that we now turn. 
 
 
3.  Logical and linguistic properties of “no evidence” state-
ments 
 
The nine examples presented in section 2 are representative of 
the different types of “no evidence” statements used in public 
health contexts. On the basis of these examples, a number of 
general observations can be made about the linguistic and logi-
cal properties of these statements. In terms of their lexical fea-
tures, “no evidence” statements are introduced by nouns that 
either have probative force (e.g., evidence, proof) or display ep-
istemic attributes (e.g., justification, knowledge). These nouns 
are typically preceded by negative terms such as ‘no’ or ‘not’. 
Occasionally, phrases such as ‘a lack of’ and ‘an absence of’ are 
used in place of negative words. One or more pre-modifying ad-
jectives are normally present and express a temporal restriction 
on the noun (e.g., current evidence), describe the disciplinary 
origin of the evidence in question (e.g., scientific evidence) or 
reflect a probative standard that evidence may be expected to 
attain (e.g., convincing evidence). Some pre-modifying adjec-
tives are intended to emphasize that there is not even a hint or 
trace of evidence in support of a proposition. The use of a super-
lative adjective is particularly effective in this regard (e.g., not 
the slightest evidence). Similar linguistic emphasis is achieved 
through the use of postpositive adjectives (e.g., no evidence 
whatever). 
These linguistic features of “no evidence” statements are 
not mere stylistic or rhetorical devices. Rather, their true signifi-
cance lies in the contribution they make to the logical properties 
of “no evidence” statements. Those properties can be best char-
acterized in terms of an informal fallacy that logicians have var-
iously called the argument from ignorance or argumentum ad 
ignorantiam. “no evidence” statements of the type examined 
here function as premises in these arguments. Schedler (1980: 
70) effectively makes this point when he states that “…a reader 
assumes that ‘there is no reason to believe P’ at least implies, or 
perhaps is another way of saying, ‘there is reason to believe P is 
false’…”. The logical function of these statements can be seen 
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in the argument below, where the premise is a paraphrase of the 
“no evidence” statement presented in (8) above: 
 
PREMISE: There is no evidence that genetic modification of 
food is harmful. 
CONCLUSION:  Therefore, genetic modification of food is 
not harmful. 
 
This argument has the logical structure of a classic argument 
from ignorance, in which an arguer reasons from a lack of 
knowledge (evidence or proof) that P is the case (where P stands 
in this instance for the proposition “genetic modification of food 
is harmful”) to the conclusion that P is not the case (i.e., genetic 
modification of food is not harmful). Similarly, an arguer may 
reason from a lack of knowledge (evidence or proof) that P is 
not the case to the conclusion that P is the case. Regardless of 
the (positive or negative) logical form of the argument used, all 
arguments from ignorance involve an (illicit) shifting of the ne-
gation operator (~). This is indicated by the following notation 
in which ‘KP’ stands for “proposition P is known to be true”: 
 
Positive logical form of argument from ignorance:      
  ~KP therefore ~P 
Negative logical form of argument from ignorance:     
 ~K~P therefore P 
 
Until some relatively recent developments in logic,2 the standard 
view of this argument had been that it is fallacious on the 
grounds that the absence of evidence or knowledge that a propo-
sition is true does not constitute proof that a proposition is false. 
It is not difficult to bring forward examples where the character-
ization of the argument as a fallacy is indeed warranted. At the 
outset of the BSE epidemic, “no evidence” statements such as 
the following were repeatedly used by health officials and poli-
ticians in an effort to alleviate public concerns about the disease: 
 
There is no evidence that BSE is transmissible to humans. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The developments in question, which include the emergence of disciplines 
such as informal logic and argumentation theory, were largely ushered in by 
the publication of Charles Hamblin’s book Fallacies in 1970. Hamblin’s text 
railed against the so-called “standard treatment” of the fallacies. This land-
mark book is largely credited with transforming the study of fallacies from 
the “debased, worn-out and dogmatic” (12) treatments offered in logic text-
books to the more systematic analyses of these arguments that are now com-
monplace. 
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This “no evidence” statement was certainly factually correct—in 
1986 and for several years thereafter, there was indeed no evi-
dence that BSE was transmissible to humans. However, this 
statement went beyond merely informing a worried public about 
this new disease to raising a misleading implication in the minds 
of consumers. That implication took the form of a proposition to 
the effect that BSE was not transmissible to humans. Of course, 
public health officials could not reasonably make this latter 
claim at the outset of the BSE problem. The lengthy incubation 
period of spongiform encephalopathies, in some cases of several 
decades, meant that it would be many years before natural 
transmission of BSE to humans could be demonstrated. But such 
is the lure of this implication that health officials only needed to 
“trigger” it by using a “no evidence” statement and then leave 
the public to come to the conclusion that BSE is not transmissi-
ble to humans. The widespread public dismay at the announce-
ment to British Parliament in March 1996 that BSE had trans-
mitted to humans suggests that many people did indeed draw 
this particular conclusion. 
However, alongside fallacious uses of “no evidence” 
statements, it is also possible to identify cases in which these 
statements have real probative value in a public health context. 
In a situation where a knowledge base in a particular domain is 
closed and has been exhaustively searched, and a proposition is 
found not to be contained within that base, it is then reasonable 
to conclude that the proposition in question is false. To demon-
strate how conditions of epistemic closure and exhaustive search 
may be satisfied in a particular case, it is necessary to return to 
the BSE problem. The following argument from ignorance was 
used by Brown and colleagues in 1987, just months after the 
emergence of BSE in British cattle. The argument concluded a 
15-year epidemiological study of CJD in France and a review of 
world literature on this disease by Brown et al. (1987): 
 
There is no evidence that scrapie in sheep is transmissible 
to humans. 
Therefore, scrapie in sheep is not transmissible to humans. 
 
Certain features of Brown et al.’s investigation meant that the 
above argument from ignorance was able to satisfy conditions of 
epistemic closure and exhaustive search.  Brown et al.’s epide-
miological study of CJD had run over many years, during which 
time no transmission of scrapie to humans had been found to 
occur. This extended period of time was the basis upon which 
investigators were able to claim closure of the knowledge base 
on scrapie and its possible links to CJD. Brown et al.’s review of 
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the world literature further ensured that the knowledge base on 
scrapie and CJD had been exhaustively searched. Under these 
conditions, it was reasonable for Brown et al. to conclude, as in 
fact they did, that scrapie is not transmissible to humans. In this 
case, the absence of evidence in support of P did indeed consti-
tute proof of not-P. This conclusion was to hold considerable 
significance for BSE investigators, as it was to become the basis 
of subsequent risk assessments of the disease.3 But for our cur-
rent purposes, this example demonstrates that “no evidence” 
statements, and the ignorance arguments that contain them, can 
be more or less rationally warranted in accordance with the sat-
isfaction of logical and epistemic conditions such as epistemic 
closure and exhaustive search. 
The discussion of the logical properties of “no evidence” 
statements is still not complete, however. For some mention 
must be made of the contribution to these properties of the lin-
guistic features that were described at the outset of this section. 
Features such as pre-modifying superlative adjectives (e.g., not 
the slightest evidence) and postpositive adjectives (e.g., no evi-
dence whatever) emphasize that the search of a knowledge base 
in a certain domain has been particularly exhaustive. The use of 
temporal adjectives (e.g., no current evidence) indicates that 
while a knowledge base may be closed at a certain point in time, 
it may need to be opened in the future as new evidence is forth-
coming. Expressions such as “no convincing evidence” and “no 
scientific evidence” stipulate the type of evidence that can legit-
imately be included in a knowledge base. The evidence in this 
base must attain a certain minimum probative standard (i.e., it 
should be convincing). It must also originate from a rational in-
quiry such as science rather than from divine, spiritual or mysti-
cal sources (or a host of other irrational enterprises). It is in this 
sense that the linguistic features of “no evidence” statements are 
not superficial stylistic or rhetorical devices. Rather, these fea-
tures are contributing to the logical function of “no evidence” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The conclusion that “scrapie is not transmissible to humans” formed the 
minor premise in the following frequently employed analogical argument 
during the BSE crisis. This argument became the mainstay of scientific risk 
assessments of BSE: 
 
MAJOR PREMISE: Scrapie and BSE are similar in certain re-
spects. 
MINOR PREMISE: Scrapie is not transmissible to humans. 
CONCLUSION: Therefore, BSE will not be transmissible to 
humans. 
	  
“No Evidence” Statements in Public Health 
	  
© Louise Cummings. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2015), pp. 32-64. 
	  
41	  
statements through their stipulation of the type of knowledge 
base that can stand in a particular domain.  
 
 
4.  The psychology of “no evidence” statements 
 
The discussion so far has focussed on the logico-linguistic prop-
erties of “no evidence” statements. On the basis of these proper-
ties, it was shown that some uses of these statements in argu-
ments from ignorance in a public health context are rationally 
warranted while other uses fall short of an acceptable rational 
standard and are, accordingly, judged to be fallacious. However, 
an issue of some interest concerns the psychology of these 
statements. This is because these statements are used in public 
health communication not only with an informative purpose, but 
also with the purpose of persuading members of the public to 
adopt certain beliefs or pursue particular courses of action. And 
this latter purpose is decidedly psychological in nature. The is-
sue of the psychological attributes of “no evidence” statements 
naturally resolves into two parts. Firstly, we want to consider the 
psychological character of these statements from the point of 
view of the public health official or other professional who uses 
these statements in communication with the public. The public 
health communicator is motivated by a wide-ranging set of 
goals, which is often at odds with logical ideals relating to the 
use of valid, or at least rationally warranted, arguments. Second-
ly, we also need to consider the psychological character of “no 
evidence” statements from the point of view of the members of 
the public to whom these statements are directed. Through rea-
sons of indifference or cognitive limitations, the public may 
adopt a very different response to “no evidence” statements 
from the one intended by public health officials. This aspect of 
the issue can be usefully addressed by examining data from a 
recent study of public health reasoning by 879 members of the 
public.  
Although “no evidence” statements can assume a number 
of forms in public health contexts, one almost consistent feature 
of these statements are the factors that motivate their use. These 
factors invariably involve a concern on the part of public health 
communicators to allay public anxiety and avert widespread 
panic even in cases where anxiety and panic are not altogether 
unwarranted. How can the agents of public health communica-
tion best achieve this reduction in anxiety? For the most part, it 
seems that this question has been answered by ensuring that 
public health communication is used to minimize, or in some 
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cases even trivialize, the human health risks associated with a 
particular action, state or event. Thus, communications of the 
form “There is no evidence that X causes adverse health effects” 
are routinely released through the print and broadcast media in 
the certain knowledge that a guileless public will subconsciously 
conclude that “X does not cause adverse health effects”. These 
statements are certainly not without their merits from the point 
of view of the person who employs them in public health com-
munication. They are “safe” statements in that the speaker who 
produces them knows he is uttering a factually correct state-
ment—on many occasions there is indeed no evidence that a 
particular X (food additive, immunization, etc.) causes adverse 
health effects. Legal repercussions are thus minimized and sci-
entific standards of truth and objectivity are upheld as the 
speaker is not heard to utter a falsehood. These statements are 
also logically seductive in that the speaker who uses them 
knows that an inference to the effect that X does not cause ad-
verse health effects is almost automatic on the part of the hearer. 
So, the public health official secures his desired communicative 
aim—a belief on the part of the hearer that X does not cause ad-
verse health effects—without incurring negative consequences, 
which include a loss of scientific standing and possible legal re-
dress. 
Of course, it may be argued that this is merely one inter-
pretation of the psychological propensities of the speaker who 
uses “no evidence” statements in a public health context. More-
over, it may also be claimed that this interpretation is somewhat 
unfair on the question of what motivates such a speaker to pro-
duce these statements. However, if we return to the actual use of 
these statements in public health contexts, it can be seen that this 
interpretation is not without support. Only occasionally do pub-
lic health communicators include additional information that 
serves to qualify “no evidence” statements. This information 
may be seen to describe conditions that preclude the closure of a 
knowledge base in a particular area or limit the extent to which 
this base can be exhaustively searched. In the absence of the ful-
filment of these logical and epistemic conditions, a hearer is 
much less inclined to conclude from a lack of evidence that X 
causes adverse health effects that X does not cause adverse 
health effects. A rare example of the use of this additional in-
formation during the BSE epidemic occurred in a press release 
in October 1995 by the then Chief Medical Officer, Dr Kenneth 
Calman. Dr Calman’s statement marked the publication of the 
fourth annual report of the CJD surveillance unit. He remarked: 
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I continue to be satisfied that there is currently no scien-
tific evidence of a link between meat eating and devel-
opment of CJD and that beef and other meats are safe to 
eat. However, in view of the long incubation period of 
CJD, it is important that the Unit continues its surveil-
lance of CJD for some years to come. (BSE Inquiry 
2000: 149) 
 
If we compare this statement with Dr Calman’s statement in (1) 
above, we can see that the Chief Medical Officer is displaying 
greater caution on this occasion. During this press release, there 
are at least two ways Dr Calman signals that the knowledge base 
on CJD cannot be closed. His use of the adverb ‘currently’ indi-
cates that our knowledge base on CJD may have to be revised at 
a later point in time if new evidence emerges. Also, Dr Calman 
describes a condition that precludes the closure of the base—the 
lengthy incubation period of CJD. 
The BSE epidemic found public health officials acting un-
der the dual pressures of containing an escalating animal and 
human health problem and managing a growing sense of public 
disquiet. This wider context inevitably influenced the frequency 
and nature of public health communication during the BSE af-
fair. However, not all public health communication takes place 
in a context of crisis management of the kind that Dr Calman 
and his colleagues confronted. Some of the “no evidence” 
statements examined in section 2 were produced by expert advi-
sory groups convened to consider the health risks of certain ac-
tivities (e.g., the use of wind turbines). These groups met under 
very different conditions from those that characterized the work 
of public health officials during the BSE crisis. These expert 
groups were able to engage in an altogether slower process of 
deliberation in which all the scientific evidence relating to a par-
ticular public health concern was fully considered. Also, there 
was no public clamour for urgent measures to be taken to ad-
dress a rapidly escalating public health problem. In this very dif-
ferent context, “no evidence” statements were not used by pub-
lic health officials to achieve public reassurance by dismissing 
health risks. Rather, these statements were intended by those 
who used them to reflect a robust assessment of risk based on a 
rational, deliberative process of inquiry. The psychological dis-
position of the public health communicator in this latter scenario 
was not to allay public anxiety at all costs—even at the costs of 
misguiding the public—but to provide a balanced risk assess-
ment based on scientific evidence. The use of “no evidence” 
statements in this type of scenario was thus less a tool of public 
pacification and more an instrument of rational appraisal.    
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Thus far, we have considered the psychology of “no evi-
dence” statements from the point of view of the speaker who 
uses them. This speaker was characterized as operating with 
quite different priorities in different public health contexts. If the 
speaker’s intention in communicating was primarily to allay 
public anxiety by dismissing or trivializing health risks, “no evi-
dence” statements were often pressed into use in order to 
achieve this goal. These statements were a largely effective, but 
ultimately deceptive, means of pacifying a public worried about 
health risks. In the case of BSE, unsuspecting members of the 
public were not aware that these statements were being used in 
fallacious arguments from ignorance, preferring instead to ac-
quiesce in the reassuring conclusion of “no health risk” that the-
se arguments appeared to suggest. In other public health con-
texts, these same arguments marked the conclusion of a robust 
process of risk assessment in which there was full consideration 
of all the scientific evidence relating to a particular health con-
cern. Under conditions in which there is an exhaustive search of 
a closed knowledge base by an expert advisory group, for ex-
ample, claims of “no health risk” were often rationally warrant-
ed. The psychological dispositions of speakers are thus intimate-
ly connected to both rational and fallacious uses of “no evi-
dence” statements in arguments from ignorance. These disposi-
tions can transform the use of “no evidence” statements from a 
rational strategy of risk assessment on one occasion to a decep-
tive strategy whose purpose is to deflect public anxiety on an-
other occasion. To the extent that psychological attributes influ-
ence how speakers use “no evidence” statements, it is interesting 
to ask if the recipients of these statements, namely members of 
the public, have certain psychological capacities that guide their 
response to these statements. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
 
 
5.  Testing public understanding of “no evidence” statements 
 
“No evidence” statements in public health are assessed for their 
logical or other merits by members of the public. It is, therefore, 
relevant to ask if people have the type of rational psychological 
capacity that equips them to undertake this assessment. This was 
the question addressed by a recent study of public health reason-
ing in 879 subjects (see Cummings (2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 
2014d, 2014e, 2015) for full details and discussion). Among 
other issues, this study examined the logical and epistemic con-
ditions under which subjects accepted or rejected “no evidence” 
statements used in arguments from ignorance. Participating sub-
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jects, who were aged between 18 and 65 years and were drawn 
from diverse educational, socioeconomic and ethnic back-
grounds, were required to assess eight public health scenarios. 
These scenarios were presented to subjects in the form of a writ-
ten questionnaire, which was completed anonymously. The sce-
narios, which are briefly described in Table 1, were followed by 
four questions. Two of these four questions were designed to 
check if the respondent had understood explicit information con-
tained in the passage. These questions created the impression for 
respondents that they were engaging in a reading comprehension 
task rather than participating in a reasoning experiment.4 A third 
question was intended to establish if the respondent had drawn a 
particular inference from an ignorance argument. A fourth ques-
tion invited an open-ended response in which the respondent 
was encouraged to expand on his or her reasons for judging “no 
evidence” claims in a certain way. Passages were devised so as 
to vary the two logical conditions (epistemic closure and ex-
haustive search) under which arguments from ignorance are as-
sessed to be more or less rationally warranted (see Table 1). Be-
cause prior beliefs about an issue or topic have been found to 
influence reasoning, an equal number of actual and non-actual 
(but plausible) public health scenarios were employed.5 An ex-
ample of one of the public health scenarios used in the study is 
presented below. This scenario was used to represent the logical 
condition <full closure, exhaustive search>: 
 
A new asthma drug is about to be released onto the mar-
ket. As with all new drugs, it has undergone extensive 
clinical trials. These trials have been conducted in several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There is considerable evidence of contextual effects on human reasoning. 
For example, the type of instructions given to subjects can affect their per-
formance on reasoning tasks (Valentine 1985). With this in mind, it was con-
sidered important not to make subjects aware that the purpose of the study 
was to examine respondents’ ability to draw inferences about public health 
problems. Such an instruction may have disinclined subjects to derive infer-
ences from information in the passages when these same inferences may have 
been readily generated under other circumstances.	  
5	  It is expected that background knowledge and beliefs will affect the infor-
mation that subjects attend to in the passages and the significance that sub-
jects attach to this information. As Klahr (2000: 30) remarks: “When people 
are reasoning about real world contexts, their prior knowledge imposes 
strong theoretical biases…These biases influence not only the initial strength 
with which hypotheses are held—and hence the amount of disconfirming 
evidence necessary to refute them—but also the features in the evidence that 
will be attended to and encoded”.  
	  
Louise Cummings 
	  
© Louise Cummings. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2015), pp. 32-64. 
	  
46	  
medical facilities in North America, the UK and Europe. 
The drug has been tested by the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer on a range of human subjects, including children and 
adults of different ages and both sexes. In total, several 
thousand subjects participated in the trials. The manufac-
turer wants an independent review of the findings of these 
studies to be conducted by experts on drug safety. To this 
end, a committee of pharmacologists, statisticians and 
physicians in respiratory medicine is assembled to assess 
the efficacy and safety of the drug in question. After ex-
tensive consideration of all the available evidence, the 
committee concludes that there is no evidence that the 
asthma drug is unsafe. 
 
(a) Is the new drug to be used in the treatment of arthritis? 
  (b) Is the new drug safe for use in human subjects?       
    Yes      No     Don’t know                                                                                               
(c) Name two types of experts on the committee. 
(d) Please explain your response to (b). 
 
1 Full closure; exhaustive search; actual scenario: 
Risk assessment of the transmissibility of scrapie to humans 
2 Full closure; exhaustive search; non-actual scenario: 
Assessment of findings from clinical trials of a new asthma drug 
3 Incomplete closure; limited search; actual scenario: 
Risk assessment of the transmissibility of BSE to humans 
4 Incomplete closure; limited search; non-actual scenario: 
Health risks associated with chemicals in effluent from a phar-
maceutical plant 
5 Full closure; limited search; actual scenario: 
Assessment of the safety of genetically modified foods 
6 Full closure; limited search; non-actual scenario: 
Assessment of the safety of a food additive in dairy products 
7 Incomplete closure; exhaustive search; actual scenario: 
Safety of swine flu immunization 
8 Incomplete closure; exhaustive search; non-actual scenario: 
Location of the source of an outbreak of severe food poisoning 
 
Table 1. Description of public health scenario 
 
The results from this study provide general support for the claim 
that members of the public exercise a rational psychological ca-
pacity when required to assess “no evidence” statements in a 
public health context. Moreover, this capacity largely reflects 
the logical and epistemic distinctions that were characterized 
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above in terms of the epistemic closure and exhaustive search of 
a knowledge base. Subjects accepted more inferences under 
conditions of <full closure, exhaustive search> than under any 
other condition, and rejected more inferences under conditions 
of <incomplete closure, limited search> than under any other 
condition. The following diagram shows that these acceptance 
and rejection rates accord with the logical and epistemic condi-
tions which, it was argued above, confer the greatest and the 
least rational warrant, respectively, on “no evidence” statements 
in arguments from ignorance: 
 
               MAXIMUM 
                                
                                (1) Full closure, exhaustive search: 68.4%  
accept; 31.6% reject 
Rational                 (2) Full closure, limited search: 33% accept; 
67% reject 
Warrant                 (3) Incomplete closure, exhaustive search: 
16.6% accept; 83.4% reject 
                                (4) Incomplete closure, limited search: 
10.3% accept; 89.7% reject 
 
                MINIMUM 
 
Moreover, a number of significant Pearson chi-square values 
indicated that differences in acceptance and rejection rates could 
not be explained by chance. For example, the distinction be-
tween the full and incomplete closure of a knowledge base (sce-
narios 3 and 6) and an exhaustive and limited search of that base 
(scenarios 8 and 4) both resulted in significant chi-square values 
of 0.029 and 0.022 (p < 0.05), respectively. Findings of this type 
suggested that these logical and epistemic conditions had some 
psychological reality in whatever rational capacity subjects were 
using to make judgements about the public health scenarios con-
tained in the passages. Responses to the open-ended questions 
after each passage confirmed these quantitative findings and 
supported the idea that these conditions held true logical sway 
for the subjects in this study. In response to the above passage 
concerning a new asthma drug, many respondents made com-
ments which suggested that they were satisfied that the drug’s 
manufacturer had made every reasonable effort to ensure that 
the knowledge base was closed (evidence had been gathered 
from “extensive clinical trials” involving “several thousand sub-
jects”), and that this base had been exhaustively searched (a 
committee of experts considered “all the available evidence”). 
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This was a sufficient basis for these subjects to conclude that if 
there was no evidence that the asthma drug was unsafe then it 
was not unsafe (i.e., it was safe). In this way, a 25-year-old, 
white British, university educated man responded: 
 
If after considering the evidence from several thousand 
tests on people of various ages and both genders did not 
produce any evidence that the drug is unsafe then it must 
be safe for human use. 
 
 The verbal expressions used by a number of respondents 
indicated that they were making direct use of logical features of 
the argument from ignorance in guiding their judgements. A 39-
year-old, white British, university educated woman stated that 
“double negative indicates a positive”, which is a reference to 
the use of two negative terms in the statement “there is no evi-
dence that the drug is unsafe (not safe)”. The word ‘positive’ in 
this woman’s response refers to the movement of the first of 
these negative terms in front of the adjective ‘unsafe’ to result in 
the ‘positive’ adjective ‘safe’. Similarly, respondents were often 
quite forthright in expressing when they believed that logical 
and epistemic conditions had not been adequately fulfilled by 
“no evidence” statements and the arguments that contained 
them. For example, many subjects recognized that the lengthy 
incubation period of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 
meant that it would be many years before investigators could 
reasonably claim a closed knowledge base on BSE. Certainly, 
the relatively short period between the emergence of BSE in 
1986 and public health pronouncements “in the late 1980s” sug-
gesting that there was no evidence of the disease’s transmission 
to humans was judged by many subjects to be an inadequate 
timescale for this closure to take place. One subject, a 50-year-
old, white British, secondary level educated man, used an analo-
gy with asbestosis to indicate that health risks often only be-
come apparent many years after the point of exposure to a nox-
ious substance or agent. For this respondent, insufficient time 
had elapsed by the late 1980s for the absence of BSE transmis-
sion to humans to have any real probative value in this case:   
        
The lack of evidence could be attributable to the long in-
cubation period. For instance, asbestosis can occur 30 
years after exposure to asbestos. BSE only emerged in 
1986; without long historical data how can we tell how 
long the incubation period of a human version of BSE 
would be? 
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 Similarly, subjects were also able to discern when some, 
but not all, of the logical and epistemic properties of arguments 
from ignorance were satisfied in a public health scenario. For 
example, in passage 5, the issue of the safety of genetically 
modified foods was examined. In their consideration of this pas-
sage, some subjects could be seen to weigh up a number of dif-
ferent factors. Some of these factors suggested the knowledge 
base on GM foods was likely to be closed (full closure), while 
other factors indicated that an exhaustive search of the base had 
not taken place (limited search) and, therefore, that any conclu-
sion based upon this search was likely to have limited rational 
warrant. Negative factors tended to “win out” in a scenario of 
this type, with only 17.6% of respondents accepting, and 82.4% 
rejecting, the conclusion suggested by the “no evidence” state-
ment in this case. The respondent who produced the following 
comment, a 37-year-old, white British, university educated man, 
identified that the search of the knowledge base was compro-
mised on this occasion: 
 
There has been extensive testing of GM foods and a large 
amount of evidence is available but since the scientist has 
not studied the evidence he cannot make a valid argu-
ment and we cannot make a balanced decision. 
 
 This same respondent also consciously weighed up com-
peting factors in passage 6, which examined the use of a food 
additive in dairy products. Once again, the negative epistemic 
property of this passage (limited search) tended to outweigh the 
positive epistemic property (full closure), with only 33% of re-
spondents accepting, and 67% rejecting, the conclusion suggest-
ed by the “no evidence” statement: 
 
We don’t know if the additive is safe for human con-
sumption even though there is available extensive litera-
ture on the additive in question as the scientist who ap-
peared on the TV programme had not read much of the 
information therefore he cannot justify this statement and 
we cannot make a judgement. 
 
 In general, respondents’ judgements were more heavily 
influenced by negative epistemic considerations than by positive 
epistemic considerations. This was suggested by three findings. 
Firstly, even when respondents attempted to weigh up negative 
and positive epistemic properties, as the above respondent did, it 
was more often than not the negative epistemic attribute that 
emerged as decisive in judgement-making. Secondly, in many 
cases no attempt was made to balance negative and positive ep-
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istemic attributes. Rather, respondents settled on the negative 
attribute limited search as the basis of their decision-making: 
 
[T]he scientist stating GM foods are safe has not studied 
the details in depth therefore his opinion is unreliable ev-
idence. (64-year-old, white British, secondary level edu-
cated woman) 
 
[T]he scientist claiming that there is no evidence that the 
food additive is unsafe is aware of but not read the exten-
sive literature available on this subject, therefore it is his 
personal theory that it is safe. (40-year-old, Pakistani 
Asian, secondary level educated woman) 
 
 Thirdly, the tendency to give priority to negative epistemic 
factors over positive factors also manifested itself in an upward 
shift in the logical standard applied to a case. There was evi-
dence that when a negative epistemic attribute such as limited 
search existed alongside a positive epistemic attribute such as 
full closure, the logical bar on the latter property was raised. 
That is, subjects appeared to operate with a higher standard on 
what was allowed to constitute the full closure of a knowledge 
base. This was suggested by the finding that for many respond-
ents, key statements in passages 5 and 6, such as “extensively 
field-tested and laboratory-tested over many years”, “widely 
used for 40 years” and “the subject of numerous studies”, did 
not lead them to conclude that the knowledge bases on GM 
foods and the dairy food additive were adequately closed. This 
was despite the fact that similar expressions in other scenarios 
appeared to give respondents confidence that the knowledge ba-
ses in these cases were closed:  
 
Scientists have studied impact of GM foods on human 
health, and there is no evidence that it is unsafe. Howev-
er, this does not mean that there will not be long term ef-
fects or as yet undetected adverse effects of GM foods. 
(50-year-old, white British, university educated woman) 
 
The additive has been widely used for 40 years and dur-
ing that time numerous tests have been undertaken. That 
suggests safety, but doesn’t constitute proof of it. (62-
year-old, white British, university educated man) 
 
 The presence of a negative epistemic attribute appeared to 
heighten subjects’ logical acuity, with the result that they went 
on to impose a higher standard on what constituted the full clo-
sure of a knowledge base in a particular domain. This tendency 
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was confirmed in passages that examined the epistemic condi-
tions incomplete closure and exhaustive search. The negative 
epistemic attribute incomplete closure raised the logical bar on 
what constituted the exhaustive search of a knowledge base. Ac-
cordingly, in the passage that examined the safety of swine flu 
immunization (passage 7), some subjects commented that they 
were not fully satisfied with the scientific review that had been 
conducted of the evidence. This was despite the fact that the 
passage stated that the results of trials “were reviewed at length 
by drug regulatory agencies around the world (e.g., the Food 
and Drug Administration in the United States)”:  
 
Although no evidence that it was unsafe was found it 
doesn’t mean that in a larger scale review or longer term 
study wouldn’t find evidence. (36-year-old, white British, 
university educated man) 
 
Similarly, in the food poisoning scenario described in passage 8, 
respondents were informed that environmental health services 
had investigated all food processing outlets mentioned in the 
case histories of people who had developed gastrointestinal 
symptoms. This information was intended to satisfy a condition 
of exhaustive search. But once again, subjects often failed to 
attribute any probative weight to this statement. This statement 
clearly fell short of what respondents were prepared to accept as 
constituting an exhaustive search on this occasion. Accordingly, 
when asked to assess the claim by the Director of Public Health 
that “there was no evidence that the abattoir was the source of 
the outbreak”, it appeared to some subjects as if there was no 
basis for this statement whatsoever: 
 
Although the Director of Public Health stated that there 
was no evidence that an abattoir was the source of the 
outbreak of food poisoning, it is not clear what he based 
this statement on; for example, it is not clear if public 
health officials had investigated abattoirs in the locality. 
(43-year-old, white British, university educated woman) 
 
The negative lens through which positive epistemic attributes 
came to be viewed might explain the marked decrease that oc-
curred in inference acceptance rates between the conditions 
<full closure, exhaustive search> on the one hand, and the con-
ditions <incomplete closure, exhaustive search> and <full clo-
sure, limited search> on the other hand. This decrease is indicat-
ed in the scale below as the difference between (1) and (2), and 
(1) and (3), respectively:  
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                    HIGH 
  
(1) Full closure, exhaustive search, actual sce-
nario: 71.4% accept 
 
(2) Incomplete closure, exhaustive search, ac-
tual scenario: 25.3% accept  
Inference 
Acceptance          
(3) Full closure, limited search, actual scenar-
io: 17.6% accept  
 
(4) Incomplete closure, limited search, actual 
scenario: 20% accept  
      
          LOW 
 
 An explanation of this negative tendency, I argue, is to be 
found in a logical bias in conditional reasoning known as the 
negative conclusion bias (Evans 2005). At the heart of the ar-
gument from ignorance is a modus tollens inference (Cummings 
2010a). This is shown below in schematic form (left) and as ap-
plied to an argument from ignorance (right): 
 
If P then Q     
 
Not-Q 
Therefore, not-P      
If X causes cancer, then X would be in our 
cancer knowledge base. 
But X is not in our cancer knowledge base. 
Therefore, X does not cause cancer. 
 
 When in the form of an affirmative conditional statement 
(as above), the modus tollens inference is solved about 75% of 
the time (Evans 2005). This rate decreases to around 40% to 
50% of the time when a negative is introduced into the first part 
of the conditional and the conclusion is in the affirmative, as is 
shown below: 
 
If not-P then Q 
Not-Q 
Therefore, P 
 
 This large and reliable decrease has been demonstrated 
across many studies and is explained by a double negative effect 
(Evans 2005). For the conclusion of the second modus tollens 
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inference above is effectively “not not-P”, that is, P. The 
marked decrease in inference acceptance by the subjects in this 
study can also be explained in terms of a double negative effect.  
If we return to the passage on the safety of swine flu immuniza-
tion—one of the scenarios where this marked decrease was ob-
served to occur—we can see how this pattern of response can be 
explained in terms of a negative conclusion bias. The modus tol-
lens inference, which is the basis of the argument from igno-
rance in this passage, can be characterized as follows: 
 
If swine flu immunization were not safe (i.e., unsafe), then a 
scientific review of the evidence would reveal this to be the 
case. 
But a scientific review of the evidence did not reveal this to 
be the case. 
Therefore, swine flu immunization is not unsafe (i.e., is safe). 
 
 Whatever ultimately stands as an explanation of the logi-
cal performance of the subjects in this study, one thing is cer-
tainly clear: members of the public are reasonably adept at rec-
ognising the logical and epistemic conditions under which “no 
evidence” statements in arguments from ignorance are more or 
less rationally warranted. This finding raises an interesting ques-
tion of what logical or other purpose might be served by this 
particular rational capacity. It is to this question that we now 
turn.  
 
 
6.  Arguments from ignorance as cognitive heuristics 
 
This study has revealed a rational competence on the part of 
subjects that has been all but completely overlooked by the 
types of reasoning experiments that have been conducted by 
psychologists over many years. The focus of these experiments 
has typically been on deductive and inductive forms of reason-
ing, with some of the most prominent experimental work includ-
ing the mental models theory of deduction of Philip Johnson-
Laird (Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991) and the probabilistic rea-
soning investigations of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 2004). No one could reasonably 
deny that these studies have produced a wealth of knowledge 
about human reasoning. For example, we know the syllogisms 
that subjects can readily judge to be valid or invalid and the syl-
logisms that lie beyond the logical capacities of most people 
(e.g., Copeland and Radvansky 2004). We know the biases and 
errors that afflict human reasoning and the different factors 
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make these flaws more or less likely to occur (e.g., Klauer et al. 
2000). We also know the developmental stages that children 
pass through on their way to acquiring logical competence (e.g., 
Bara et al. 1995) and how this competence may be disrupted or 
impaired in adults with a range of pathological conditions (e.g., 
Mirian et al. 2011). Notwithstanding an impressive display of 
experimental findings, this knowledge of human reasoning has 
been achieved at quite a substantial cost. That cost has been the 
misrepresentation of some of our most important rational re-
sources.  
For all the insights about reasoning that this important 
body of work has provided, the approach of these studies has 
been limited in several respects. (The reader is referred to 
Cummings (2015) for a fuller discussion of these respects.) 
Firstly, there has been a preoccupation with deductive and in-
ductive forms of reasoning to the exclusion of other types of 
reasoning (e.g., presumptive, defeasible reasoning). This contin-
ues to be the case in psychological studies even though our daily 
reasoning practice suggests that deduction and induction are not 
the only, or even the dominant, modes of reasoning that people 
use in their daily affairs. (Woods (2013) has recently character-
ized these other modes of reasoning as “third way reasoning”, 
and has pursued a program of naturalized logic within which the 
current view of fallacies finds an agreeable home.) Secondly, 
studies have operated with a pre-determined notion of the nor-
mative standard that reasoning must be expected to attain in or-
der to qualify as good (valid, sound, etc.) reasoning. This stand-
ard is typically infused with rules and criteria taken from deduc-
tive logic (less often, inductive logic). Woods (2013) has re-
marked that “[i]mposing those standards on all of reasoning is a 
momentous interference” (10). The belief that deductive validity 
is the only or “best” standard of rational inference (so-called 
“deductivism”) continues to have a powerful grip on studies of 
logic, including experimental studies. (The reader is referred to 
chapters 2 and 5 in Cummings (2015) where deductivism and 
inductivism in logic are challenged.) Thirdly, any deviation 
from a deductive or inductive standard is treated as a flaw or 
error of reasoning, which is to be avoided as it reveals the per-
petual tendency of human beings to slip into irrational, illogical 
thinking. Fourthly, reasoning has largely been examined apart 
from the wider contexts in which it occurs. Experimental tasks 
typically present subjects with one or two premises from which 
they are expected to confirm or derive a conclusion. The current 
study opposes all four of these features of the psychological 
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studies of reasoning that have been conducted to date. The rest 
of this section will be devoted to explaining how and why. 
 
In section 3, it was described how the argument from ig-
norance is one of a group of arguments known as the informal 
fallacies. As their name suggests, these arguments have been 
viewed by logicians as examples of weak or shoddy reasoning 
with the particular defect in each case evading characterization 
in terms of formal or deductive logic (hence, the use of the term 
‘informal’). This group of arguments, which includes other well-
known names such as question-begging argument, straw man 
and the argument from authority, have more recently been char-
acterized as instances of presumptive reasoning (Walton 1996). 
Presumptive reasoning has been largely overshadowed by de-
duction and induction in psychological and philosophical dis-
cussions of reasoning. The reasons for this neglect are clear 
enough. Presumption is a low-grade epistemic category that is 
defeasible and, hence, readily overturned and rejected (Rescher 
2006). It cannot claim the type of epistemic absoluteness associ-
ated with the certain, known premises of deduction. But the per-
ceived weakness of presumptive reasoning from the deductiv-
ist’s viewpoint constitutes an epistemic virtue in a range of other 
contexts. In Cummings (2010a), one such context—the scien-
tific inquiry into BSE—was explored at length. In that book and 
related publications (Cummings 2002, 2009, 2011), it was de-
scribed how the tentative nature of presumptions rendered this 
concept ideally suited to the epistemic context that confronted 
scientists when BSE first emerged in British cattle. That context 
was one of pervasive uncertainty, with public health officials 
having to make risk assessments and institute protective health 
measures often on the basis of little evidence or knowledge. 
Against this epistemic backdrop, the presumptive character of 
the argument from ignorance and other informal fallacies was 
shown to be directly facilitative of inquiry. 
So, presumptive reasoning has epistemic and logical mer-
its when viewed within certain contexts of use. Later, we will 
say more about these merits. For the moment, it is important to 
emphasize that these contexts are lost to most (or all) psycholog-
ical studies of reasoning. This is because these studies abstract 
human reasoning from the contexts that are its true home. By 
locating the investigation of reasoning within the context of 
public health deliberations, the current study aims to reconnect 
reasoning with the wider epistemic notions that are its very es-
sence. Concepts such as beliefs are not confounding variables 
that need to be controlled in a psychological experiment. Rather, 
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they form the wider context of purposes, goals and intentions for 
which reasoning is undertaken. It is directly relevant to the eval-
uation of reasoning during a public health problem, for example, 
to know the purpose for which a risk assessment is undertaken. 
Is the purpose to protect human health, to avert severe economic 
consequences for a particular industry, or to restore confidence 
in a public immunization program? It is also relevant to an ap-
praisal of public health reasoning to know the physical con-
straints that confront investigators. These constraints often in-
volve temporal as well as technical limitations, in that decisions 
may need to be made within very short timescales and are often 
restricted by the experiments that are technically possible in a 
particular case. Further contextual considerations that are inte-
gral to an evaluation of public health reasoning include the con-
sequences of inaction or any delay in action. Such consequences 
may range from death or serious illness of a large number of 
people to minor physical ailments that have little or no long-
term implications for human health. It is simply not possible to 
abstract reasoning from these types of considerations in a public 
health context (or, indeed, in any other context).  
Once one admits contextual considerations within an eval-
uation of reasoning, it is no longer possible to apply a pre-
determined normative (generally deductive) standard to that rea-
soning. This is because what constitutes “good” or “valid” rea-
soning in a particular case—similarly, “bad” or “invalid” rea-
soning—must emerge from the context at hand and cannot be 
represented by context-invariant ideals of deductive validity and 
soundness. The type of reasoning that facilitates the wider goals 
and aims of public health is likely to be an anathema to the de-
ductivist. This reasoning can, and does, include jumping to con-
clusions, arguing in circles and from a lack of knowledge, and 
using quick “rules of thumb” which exploit similarities between 
situations and the opinions of trusted authorities. Not only do 
these non-deductive practices work well in public health and 
other contexts, but many (or all) of them are the reasoning strat-
egies we have identified as the informal fallacies. Alongside the 
argument from ignorance, several of these non-deductive prac-
tices have now been examined in a public health context. This 
includes fear appeal argument, analogical argument, circular ar-
gument and the appeal to authority (Cummings 2004, 2010a, 
2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b). Of course, each of these 
practices would be found wanting if they were assessed by a de-
ductive logical standard. In fact, the original characterization of 
these practices as fallacies was more often than not for the rea-
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son that they fell short of a deductive standard in reasoning.6 But 
once one concedes that deduction is not the only, or even the 
most appropriate, normative standard to apply to the evaluation 
of reasoning, these various non-deductive practices can be 
viewed in an altogether more positive logical light. Certainly, 
this has been the rationale for recent pragmatic and presumptive 
frameworks for the evaluation of the informal fallacies (see 
Cummings (2010b) for discussion of one such framework). 
So, there is nothing inherent in human reasoning that 
means it must be assessed by a normative standard based on de-
ductive logic. And even more conclusively, there is nothing in-
herent in human reasoning that means that any deviation from 
this standard represents an aberration of our rational capacity or 
is an instance of fallacious reasoning. Certainly, there are nu-
merous non-deductive ways to commit fallacious reasoning in 
public health and other contexts (see Cummings (2005) for dis-
cussion of some of these ways). Even as deductive logic is es-
chewed as a normative standard for reasoning in a range of con-
texts, we are not thereby losing sight of the rational in public 
health reasoning or anywhere else for that matter. Rationality 
and reason are still the baseline from which we proceed in rea-
soning and against which all of our deliberative practices must 
be judged. It is simply that this rationality is no longer con-
strained by deduction and is seen to have many non-deductive 
facets. As the current study demonstrated, subjects were at no 
loss to adduce reasons for their dissatisfaction with the reason-
ing of particular public health scenarios. In fact, even when such 
reasons were not part of the explicit information of the passages, 
subjects were seen to exercise their rational competence in nu-
merous other ways, such as drawing on background knowledge 
of public health issues or forging connections with earlier, simi-
lar cases. Subjects may well not have been exercising a deduc-
tive logical competence in their assessment of these scenarios. 
In fact, they were almost certainly not exercising such a compe-
tence. But they were nonetheless exercising some rational com-
petence in their judgement of these scenarios. The rejection of 
deduction was, therefore, not a more thoroughgoing rejection of 
rationality itself. 
The elements are now in place for the view of arguments 
from ignorance as cognitive heuristics that will be presented in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 An exception is question-begging argument—also known as petitio princi-
pii or circular argument—which is a deductively valid, but fallacious, argu-
ment. The reader is referred to Cummings (2000) for discussion of non-
fallacious variants of this argument. 
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the rest of this section. Those elements are that reasoning in 
public health is presumptive in nature, is sensitive to features of 
context, is warranted by pragmatic criteria and is inherently ra-
tional, notwithstanding the presence of errors or fallacies on oc-
casion. The argument from ignorance is able to function so ef-
fectively in a public health context exactly because it exhibits 
each of these attributes. To demonstrate this, it is instructive to 
return to the BSE epidemic. Throughout this epidemic, but par-
ticularly during the early phase of the crisis, “no evidence” 
statements were used extensively by public health officials. It 
was described above that some of these uses were problematic 
because they sought quick and easy reassurance of the public at 
the expense of providing an accurate risk assessment of BSE. 
However, other uses were genuinely facilitative of the scientific 
inquiry that was conducted into this disease. For example, the 
argument from ignorance generated presumptive conclusion that 
investigators were able to use to inch forward in inquiry on a 
tentative basis until such times as further evidence was forth-
coming. In the presence of contrary evidence, the defeasible na-
ture of these presumptive conclusions meant that they were 
readily overturned. But their eventual demise did not negate 
their heuristic value in progressing an inquiry that might other-
wise have stalled in the face of uncertainty created by a lack of 
evidence. In this context, the argument from ignorance served to 
transform a lack of evidence (there is no evidence that P) into a 
positive (and facilitative) epistemic resource (P is not the case). 
An example of this heuristic function is in order. 
In the early months of the BSE crisis, public health offi-
cials needed to establish priorities for research, institute 
measures to protect human health, and devise regulations for 
practices in the beef industry. In each of these areas, action 
needed to be taken with considerable urgency against an epis-
temic backdrop in which little was known about this new dis-
ease. In this context, the argument from ignorance came to 
prominence as a means of managing uncertainty by allowing 
investigators to draw some conclusions, albeit presumptive con-
clusions, which were then used as the basis of a range of actions. 
If we consider an early BSE transmission study undertaken at 
the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in Weybridge, Surrey, 
the heuristic function of the argument from ignorance can be 
seen most clearly. The decision to attempt experimental trans-
mission of BSE to some species, but not to others, was directly 
premised on what was already known about the host range of 
scrapie. It was known, for example, that scrapie had successfully 
transmitted to Cheviot sheep, mink and hamsters under experi-
“No Evidence” Statements in Public Health 
	  
© Louise Cummings. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2015), pp. 32-64. 
	  
59	  
mental conditions. Experimental transmission of BSE was, ac-
cordingly, attempted in all three species. However, there had 
been no evidence of the transmission of scrapie to exotic ungu-
lates (e.g., gemsbok) or carnivores (e.g., domestic cat) in the 250 
years in which scrapie had been endemic in the British sheep 
flock. It was reasonably concluded that scrapie had not transmit-
ted to exotic ungulates or carnivores in this time and was, thus, 
not transmissible to these species. The decision not to include 
these species in BSE transmission studies at the CVL was di-
rectly premised on this knowledge of scrapie. Moreover, this 
decision was not without rational warrant, notwithstanding the 
later natural transmission of BSE to both groups of species.7  
BSE transmission studies were not only hugely expensive 
investigations to undertake, but also took many months and even 
years to complete. There was, thus, a strong practical imperative 
to limit these studies to only those species that were most likely 
to be susceptible to BSE. Under these conditions, the argument 
from ignorance had considerable heuristic value for scientists. 
This presumptive argument became the basis upon which scien-
tists were able to exclude certain species from further considera-
tion, with the result that limited resources could be focussed on 
a small number of potentially susceptible species. The argument 
from ignorance effectively guided scientists through a myriad of 
research possibilities to realise only those possibilities that had 
the greatest likelihood of providing informative answers. This 
heuristic function of the argument can be characterized in cogni-
tive terms as a means of allocating finite cognitive resources 
such as attention, memory and planning to those problems that 
have the best prospect of issuing in a solution. The argument 
from ignorance is thus one type of evolutionary adaptation of 
our rational resources to the problem of managing information 
and choice. When these choices are large in number, as they 
were for scientists who were trying to decide which species to 
include in BSE transmission studies, the argument functioned to 
bring this choice within cognitively manageable limits. When 
information is lacking, as it was in the case of scrapie’s trans-
missibility to a range of exotic ungulates and carnivores, the ar-
gument served to transform this lack of knowledge into a posi-
tive resource for use in further deliberations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The first case of BSE in a gemsbok occurred in 1987. In 1990, the veteri-
nary school at Bristol University identified the first case of BSE in a domes-
tic cat. Neither species had previously been susceptible to scrapie, and their 
susceptibility to BSE suggested a different host range for this new disease. 
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This view of the argument from ignorance and, indeed, 
other informal fallacies as cognitive heuristics is only beginning 
to emerge in the literature on the nature and function of heuris-
tics. (The reader is referred to Walton (2010) for another signifi-
cant contribution to this literature.) Within recent additions to 
this body of work, heuristics have been described in terms that 
are largely congruent with the characterization of the argument 
from ignorance that has been given in this paper. In this way, 
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009: 107) describe heuristics as “ef-
ficient cognitive processes that ignore information”. Smithson 
(2008: 210) states that “at least some heuristics earn their keep 
by being not only fast and frugal, but also sufficiently accurate 
to be effective or adaptive”. The combination of increased cog-
nitive efficiency and sufficient accuracy is in stark contrast to 
the view of heuristics that had taken shape by the end of the 20th 
century, a view in which the use of heuristics had become asso-
ciated with “shoddy mental software” (Gigerenzer and Brighton 
2009: 109). But as cognitive researchers from a range of disci-
plinary backgrounds including psychology and computing have 
converged on the study of heuristics, it has become increasingly 
clear that heuristics are not in any way “second-best”. Moreover, 
their avoidance of resource-intensive processing does not reduce 
their accuracy and can actually improve it (see Gigerenzer and 
Brighton (2009) for further discussion). Certainly, in a public 
health context heuristics have considerable value through their 
direct facilitation of the cognitive inquiries of this domain. The 
key role of informal fallacies within the heuristics of this do-
main finds informal logic standing alongside disciplines like 
psychology and computing for the first time in providing an ex-
planation of this important rational resource.        
 
 
7. Summary 
 
This article has examined the widespread use of “no evidence” 
statements in public health. The logical and linguistic features of 
these statements were considered, with the logical focus on the 
use of these statements as premises in arguments from igno-
rance. These arguments were shown to be rationally warranted 
under certain conditions, which included the epistemic closure 
of a knowledge base in a particular domain and the exhaustive 
search of that base. The psychology of “no evidence” statements 
in public health was discussed, both from the point of view of 
the speaker (generally, a public health official) who uses these 
statements, and the hearer (typically, members of the public) 
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who receives these statements. The results of an experimental 
study of public health reasoning in 879 subjects confirmed that 
lay people are generally adept at identifying the logical and epis-
temic conditions under which “no evidence” statements in ar-
guments from ignorance are more and less rationally warranted 
in a public health context. The article concluded with the charac-
terization of arguments from ignorance as cognitive heuristics 
that have a facilitative function in public health reasoning. 
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